



March 17, 2026

The Honorable Erin Koegel  
Co-Chair  
Committee on Commerce Finance and  
Policy  
Minnesota House of Representatives  
5<sup>th</sup> Floor Centennial Office Building  
St. Paul, MN 55155

The Honorable Tim O'Driscoll  
Co-Chair  
Committee on Commerce Finance and  
Policy  
Minnesota House of Representatives  
2nd Floor Centennial Office Building  
St. Paul, MN 55155

**RE: HF 4250, Ticket resale disclosures and price regulated, and reports required**

Dear Co-Chair Koegel and Co-Chair O'Driscoll,

On behalf of the National Consumers League (NCL),<sup>1</sup> I am writing regarding House File 4250 (HF 4250).<sup>2</sup> NCL supports the goals of many of the bill's common-sense consumer protection reforms. However, we urge the Committee to carefully evaluate the potential unintended consumer protection consequences of the bill's proposed resale pricing provisions.

The debate over ticketing reform is often framed as a contest between consumer advocates and industry bad actors. In reality, the live event marketplace is a complex ecosystem in which primary ticket issuers, vertically integrated platforms, artists, promoters, venues, brokers, and secondary exchanges all respond to economic incentives. Dominant firms in the primary market raise legitimate competition concerns, while secondary marketplaces and brokers respond to scarcity and demand. Policy proposals in this space frequently shift advantages among these actors, sometimes in ways that are not immediately apparent. Rarely are the concerns of the Minnesotans who power the success of live events in the state top of mind for these industry players.

HF 4250 includes several provisions that NCL strongly supports and that reflect broad stakeholder consensus, including all-in pricing requirements, enhanced disclosure obligations for ticket resellers, and prohibitions on deceptive resale websites that

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<sup>1</sup> Founded in 1899, NCL is the nation's oldest consumer advocacy organization. Our non-profit mission is to advocate for consumers and workers in the United States and beyond. For more information, visit [www.nclnet.org](http://www.nclnet.org).

<sup>2</sup> Minnesota Legislature. *House File 4250*. 94th Leg., 2026. Online: <https://www.revisor.mn.gov/bills/94/2026/0/HF/4250/versions/0/>

misrepresent affiliations with venues or artists. These measures would meaningfully improve transparency and reduce consumer confusion in Minnesota's ticket marketplace.

However, the bill would also cap resale prices at 115 percent of the original ticket price, inclusive of fees. Resale caps are often promoted by Live Nation-Ticketmaster and its allies in the venue and artists communities in the name of preventing excessive markups and promoting affordability. However, experience and market data suggest that rigid caps can produce unintended consequences if not carefully calibrated and paired with strong enforcement mechanisms.

Demand for high-profile events does not diminish when resale prices are constrained. Instead, transactions may shift away from regulated, buyer-protected platforms to informal or unregulated channels, including social media marketplaces, peer-to-peer payment platforms, and offshore resale sites. These channels often lack basic consumer safeguards such as identity verification, refund mechanisms, and fraud protection. As a result, consumers face increased risks of counterfeit tickets, duplicate barcodes, and non-delivery. In these cases, the harm is not an excessive markup—it is the complete loss of the purchase price.

In this way, a rigid resale cap may protect consumers from paying higher prices in regulated markets while simultaneously increasing their exposure to fraud in unregulated ones. This risk is not theoretical; it reflects well-documented market behavior when price signals are artificially constrained without corresponding enforcement against off-platform transactions.

NCL does not take an ideological position against resale price caps. However, any such policy should be evaluated based on its real-world impact on overall consumer harm—not solely on its effect on nominal prices. This includes careful consideration of enforcement capacity and the extent to which transactions may migrate away from regulated channels.

Moreover, the Committee should consider whether the proposed cap could inadvertently reinforce the market position of dominant primary ticketing platforms. For example, limiting resale margins may shift revenue toward mechanisms such as dynamic pricing or platform-controlled resale exchanges, increasing fee extraction without improving consumer outcomes. Public policy in this area should aim to protect consumers—not to advantage any particular market participant.

For these reasons, NCL respectfully urges the Committee to closely examine the consumer protection implications of the proposed resale pricing cap and consider whether modifications or alternative approaches may better achieve the bill's objectives.

Thank you for your consideration of NCL's views on this important legislation.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "John D. Breyault". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "John" being the most prominent part.

John D. Breyault  
Vice President, Public Policy, Telecommunications, and Fraud  
National Consumers League  
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